the…transcendental good, which is convertible with truth and unity". 5 In order to prove this thesis, I briefly outline Aquinas' concept of a transcendental, explain Aquinas' thought on peace, and argue that peace is a conceptual explanation of the good.
The Transcendentals in Aquinas
In order to understand Aquinas' thought on the transcendentals one must attend to a wider philosophical problem, the division of being (ens). In contrast to Parmenides, Aquinas (following Aristotle) holds that being is not univocal (ontologically or conceptually); 6 in other words, being is not a genus. 7 This opens a problem: If being cannot be divided in the mode of a genus, then how is it divided?
Aquinas answers this question in De Veritate q. 21, a. 1. Therein, he begins by distinguishing three ways in which something can be divided: by addition from outside the essence (substance/accident division), by limitation and determination (species/genus division), and by concept (privation or conceptual division). 8 Aquinas only accepts the second and third ways as possible divisions of being. The first would assume that there is something outside of being; clearly this is false. 9 The second yields the ten categories as particular modes of being. 10 The third way is how the transcendentals add to being. Being and the transcendentals are identical in subiecto, suppositum, or res but different in ratio and hence in nomen.
11
They "add to being because the mode they express is one that is common, and consequent upon every being".
12
The categories express a certain special manner of being, being in itself (substance) or being in another (accident), but the transcendentals transcend the ten categories and apply to all of them.
Ens must be first because being is understood in the ratio of the other transcendentals but not vice-versa; all the others are included in it indistinctly. 13 The transcendentals, in turn, unfold conceptually from ens in two ways. The first follows from every being absolutely considered and the second from a being considered in relation to another. Thus, absolutely considered we have 'thing' (res) to express that 69 ; In V Meta. l. 9, n. 889. 7 In I Meta l. 9, n. 138; Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought, 69. 8 Q.D. de Ver. q. 21, a. 3, co. 9 In V Meta l. 9, n. 885. 10 De Ver. q. 21, a. 3, co; For Aquinas' derivation of the predicaments see In V Meta. l. 9, n. 889-892; In III Phys. l. 5, n. 322. 11 For Aquinas' res/nomen/ratio structure applied to this very issue see Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals, 94f. 12 De Ver. q. 1, a. 1, co.: "Alio modo ita quod modus expressus sit modus generalis consequens omne ens". 13 In II Sent. d. 8, q. 1, a. 3: "et sic simpliciter et absolute ens est prius aliis. cujus ratio est, quia ens includitur in intellectu eorum, et non e converso. unde omnia alia includuntur quodammodo in ente unite et indistincte".
all beings have an essence by which they are and 'one' (unum) to express that consequent upon every being is its undividedness. 14 The second way, considered in relation, gives us first 'something' (aliquid) which expresses the dividedness of one being from another (distinctness), 'truth' (veritas) which expresses the correspondence of being to the intellect, and 'good' (bonum) which expresses the correspondence of being to the will. 15 In other words, every being is a thing, one, something, intelligible, and appetible. 16 These rationes are, likewise, the first conceptions of the human intellect. 17 The last of the transcendentals, and the one most important for Aquinas' thought on peace, is goodness.
18
To be good, for Aquinas, is to be desirable or appetible (appetibile). Being is appetible because it is perfect (and perfective).
19
Being is perfect inasmuch as it is in act. Act, in turn, is the very ratio of esse. Hence, goodness is a transcendental and coterminous with being. 20 In other words, appetibile is part of the conceptual outflowing of being, yet is made known by its relation to will and hence is a relational transcendental. Put simply, being is not good because we desire it, but we desire it because it is good.
21
This also helps explain why Aquinas thinks that goodness has the ratio of an end, of final causality, since what is desirable must operate as a final cause. As he says elsewhere, the ratio of the good is "that which is perfective in the manner of an end". 
What is Peace?
Two of Aquinas' descriptions of peace are at the heart of his thought. The first he draws from Augustine: "tranquility of order".
23
Many of the other descriptions found 14 De Ver. q. 21, a. 1: "sed unum addit rationem indivisionis; et propter hoc est propinquissimum ad ens, quia addit tantum negationem". 15 M. Rubin, 'The Places of 'Thing' and 'Something' in Aquinas' Order of the Transcendentals', in: The Thomist, vol. 81, n. 3 (July 2017): 395-436. 16 De Ver. q. 1, a. 1, co.: "Alio modo secundum convenientiam unius entis ad aliud; et hoc quidem non potest esse nisi accipiatur aliquid quod natum sit convenire cum omni ente: hoc autem est anima, quae quodammodo est omnia, ut dicitur in III de anima. In anima autem est vis cognitiva et appetitiva. Convenientiam ergo entis ad appetitum exprimit hoc nomen bonum, ut in principio Ethic. dicitur quod bonum est quod omnia appetunt". 17 Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals, 300. 18 In I Sent. d. 8, q. 1, a. 3, co.; De Ver. q. 21, a. 3, co.; STh I, q. 16, a. 4. 19 Aquinas says that goodness is perfect in STh I, q. 5, a. 1 and perfective in de ver. q. 21, a. 1. One can easily see why. In the STh, Aquinas is arguing that goodness is a transcendental and so he must argue that goodness is perfect, since perfection implies act and act is the ratio of being. The DV, on the other hand, is focusing on the relational aspect of goodness, that it is appetible (a final cause). These are not in tension, for only what is perfect, in act, can be perfective, causing act in others. 20 STh I, q. 5, a. 1, co. 21 throughout his corpus can be reduced to this description of peace. 24 Second, Aquinas claims union (unio) and rest (quietudine) are of the very essence (ratio) of peace. 25 In reconciling and explaining these two descriptions we get a clearer view of what Aquinas thinks about peace.
Beginning with the first description (tranquility of order), order is naturally prior. In other words, tranquility presupposes order. Order, in turn, is always spoken of in relation to a principle. 26 From the divergence of causes/principles comes the divergence of orders: final, efficient, formal, or material.
27
No matter which type of causality though, all orders include distinction.
28
One cannot have order where there is absolute singularity. This is true even of the Trinity. 29 Second, all created orders include the notion of prior and posterior according to their proximity to the principal of that order (degree of influence from the cause). As Aquinas says, "order is a disposition by which things of equal and unequal nature are each given a place" 30 and order is "nothing other than a determinate relation of one part to another".
31
This determinate relation/disposition is based on their proportion to the principle of the order, which gives each its place and relation to other parts of that same order.
It seems likely that when Aquinas speaks of unio being of the ratio of peace, he is referencing ordo.
32
Union is the conjunction of many into one. Pax enim est tranquillitas mentis"; In Io., 14, l. 7, n. 1962: "Sciendum est, quod pax nihil aliud est quam tranquillitas ordinis: tunc enim aliqua dicuntur pacem habere quando eorum ordo inturbatus manet"; In I Ad Thess 1, l. 1, n. 6: "Et pax quae est finis, quia tunc est pax, quando appetitus totaliter pacatur". Order includes harmony within oneself, with others and God thereby precluding conflict and providing security in the good. Tranquility is the lack of conflict resulting from this order and includes the rest of all faculties in the good. 25 oneness, but a oneness that presupposes a multitude. 34 Just like order, in this respect, one cannot have union with absolute singularity. Likewise, Aquinas also strongly associates unio with relation. 35 Above, Aquinas said that ordo is nothing but a determinate relation. Furthermore, both stand in the more conceptually general position. Peace is the tranquility of order. Peace is the rest of union. The consonance is undeniable, and it seems reasonable that Aquinas means to use unio and ordo synonymously in relation to the ratio of peace.
36
The positive element of the ratio of peace would then be the relation (ordo), the union, of distinct constituents of a being or diverse beings.
The connection between the first element of Aquinas' description of peace, union or order, and the second, tranquility or rest, 37 is found in the type of order. Whenever Aquinas discusses peace, he always discusses it in terms of our seeking of the good. 38 In other words, the type of order/union Aquinas is describing is based on final causality, on relation to the good.
39
One can easily see why. To speak of order based on final causality simply is to speak of a tendency toward the good. 40 An appetite for the good is a determinate relation, an inchoate union. 41 This determinate relation to the good, a fundamental union with it, is universal according to Aquinas. All things have a tendency toward an end.
42
Even further, Aquinas argues that all things have the tendency to one (ultimate) end, God.
43
Though the tendency to the good is universal, the clearest example is found in the rational appetite.
44
When Aquinas speaks of the rational appetite's relation to the good, he uses a triad to express this in his mature corpus: love, desire, joy.
45
Love is 34 STh II-II, q. 17, a. 3, co.: "Unio autem est aliquorum distinctorum". 35 STh I-II, q. 25, a. 2, ad 2; q. 26, a. 2, ad 2; STh I-II, q. 28, a. 1, co.; STh III, q. 2, a. 7, co. 36 The question of the identity of union and order trades on the question of whether union can be reduced to relation. I think Aquinas says so (see footnote 35). However, if one does not think that union can be reduced to a relation, then one could say the following: order is the material element, union the formal. Union would be formal, and denote the oneness produced by relations, but not the determinate relations. Alternatively, one might make a move similar to what Aquinas says about the ratio of the good. "The ratio of the good implies a relation, not because the name good signifies only a relation, but because it signifies something upon which a relation is consequent along with the relation itself". See De Ver. q. 21, a. 6. It seems likely that something similar could be said of ordo and unio. Order signifies both the determinate relation and what is consequent to it, the union. Union signifies both the conjunction of many into one and that from which it follows, the determinate relation. 37 Aquinas tends to use tranquility and rest synonymously, but on occasion distinguishes them. When distinguished, he uses tranquility to denote the lack of exterior disturbances and quiet/rest to denote a lack of interior desire/motion. E.g. In I Tim c. 2, l. Desire follows when full union with that good is lacking. Joy is the fruition caused by the possession of the object of the rational appetite.
47
It is within this triad that we can locate Aquinas' thought on tranquility/rest.
In ST I-II q. 70, a. 3, Aquinas relates peace to the will's ongoing order/union with the good. Therein, Aquinas claims that peace is the perfection of joy in two ways. The first is that one's joy is undisturbed by others or by other appetites. The other is the rest of restless desire (desideria fluctuantis). 48 In other words, (full) peace is the lack of exterior and interior conflict as well as the rest of desire. Thus, Aquinas says peace is third after charity and joy.
49
"Joy is the fruition of charity, but peace is the perfection of charity".
50
In this way, peace represents the deepest unity an individual can have with the good and the perfection of unity with the good. These two negations (lack of obstacles to the good and rest in it) are exactly what Aquinas means by tranquility/rest. The first aspect is that one's seeking of the good is without obstacles/conflict.
52
This negation seems to be antecedent to one's achievement of the good and these obstacles could be contrary internal appetites or other persons. 53 The second aspect is rest (quietundine). This element is the rest of all faculties in the good. 54 Rest is a lack of motion, the termination of motion. 55 This element of tranquility seems to be subsequent to the achievement of the good, though naturally and not temporally. In other words, tranquility (also) denotes the lack of noted that the word for joy here is gaudium which is reserved for the rest in the good proper to the rational appetite. 46 STh II-II, q. 25, a. 2, ad 2. 47 Joy and peace (in its negative sense as rest) are synonymous when applied to the rational creature. Yet peace has a wider scope, for joy (and more broadly pleasure) only apply to beings with sense and intellectual appetites. Peace can apply to anything with a tendency to an end. 48 STh I-II, q. 70, a. 3, co. 49 Note though that Aquinas seems to switch this order in his Commentary on John, at least with reference to what I've termed the positive. See In Io. c. 17, l. 3, n. 2220: "Ideo autem gaudium ad unitatem sequitur, quia unitas et pax faciunt perfecte gaudere". See also In Col. c. 3, l. 3 also. There Aquinas claims that joy follows peace. The principal difference here is that Aquinas is thinking of external peace, which is dispositive. 50 In Gal. c. 5, l. 6, n. 330: "Sic ergo gaudium dicit caritatis fruitionem, sed pax caritatis perfectionem. Et per haec homo interius perficitur quantum ad bona". 51 STh I-II, q. 70, a. 3, co. 52 STh II-II, Q. 29, a. 2, co. 53 STh II-II, q. 29, a. 2, co.: "Et ideo necesse est quod omne appetens appetat pacem, inquantum scilicet omne appetens appetit tranquille et sine impedimento pervenire ad id quod appetit, in quo consistit ratio pacis, quam Augustinus definit tranquillitatem ordinis". The lack of interior obstacles seems to be what Aquinas means by tranquility, i.e. one's desire for the good is tranquil and not disturbed by contrary desires. When Aquinas references impediments, he seems to mean exterior obstacles. This makes sense with the definition of peace -tranquility of order -which applies to interior peace. Exterior peace is an integral part of this. 54 Aquinas even goes further to claim that all faculties must rest in the same good. If they are to inhabit the same order, they must be organized by the same good, i.e. have the same principle. Only in this case can conflict be precluded. 55 In IV Sent., d. 49, q. 1, a. 2, qc. 4, ad 4: "et secundum hoc quies ad quam terminatur motus". In Is., c. 26. motion that comes from achieving the good which satisfies desire entirely. Hence, as Aquinas says, peace is present to the degree one rests in the good. 56 Though Aquinas certainly means interior tranquility by peace, interior order/unity between all desires caused by training them on one object capable of fulfilling each, a lack of exterior obstacles is integral to this. As Aquinas says, concord is an integral part of peace.
57
One will not have tranquility without both a lack of disturbance in achieving the good and a rest once it is achieved. Yet Aquinas reserves the name of peace for interior rest, a lack of conflict interiorly (i.e. union between the rational, animal, and natural appetites,) which can only be had when all appetites tend (ultimately) to one object and that object can fulfill each respective appetite; 58 only there will all motion, all becoming, cease. In other words, only the final end can bring total peace because only it can bring all appetites into order/union and give them all rest. It is only by becoming part of a larger order, i.e. directing all desires to a single principle/good which gives rise to the order, that interior conflict is precluded. 59 Hence, peace denotes the appetituum unius appetentis unionem, even the natural ones.
60
Summing up Aquinas' thought on peace, one might say that peace is unio/ordo. This is the positive aspect of peace and denotes the unity between diverse beings/constituents of beings. The second element of peace is appetitive and denotes a negation of both conflict and motion. It is the lack of conflict and rest that union with the good provides. The relation between these two elements is also clear. The positive element (unio or ordo) precludes conflict and is marked by rest.
61
The integrating function of the good both provides a unity to the interior powers of the soul, since all the powers can be ordered to that good and can find rest there, and unity between different subjects.
Is Peace a Transcendental?
As one can see, the transcendentals are central to Aquinas' view of peace. Peace is born of a true (verum) unity that the good (bonum) produces from a multitude of things (res). Peace is the perfection of the good. However, this alone does not prove anything. The transcendentals are central to Aquinas' account of everything, since they are the rationes of being. In other words, a passing consonance is not sufficient to prove that 56 In IV Sent., d. 49, q. 1, a. 2, qc. 4, co. & ad 4. 57 STh II-II, q. 29, a. 1, co. 58 STh II-II, q. q. 29, a. 1, ad 1. 59 In II Thess. c. 3, l. 2. 60 STh II-II, q. 29, a. 1, co. & ad 1. Full peace goes beyond concord. Tranquility or rest includes a negative notion of being without hinderance. Thus, the full notion of peace must also have concord, a mutual seeking of the good. Yet this disturbance for Aquinas, seems to only apply to the lower appetites, and so interior peace shouldn't be thought to require concord full stop. Indeed, he claims that the highest part of the mind could rest in the good in this life and remain undisturbed. 61 STh II-II, q. 29, a. 1, co. Notice that whenever Aquinas talks about a lack of conflict, it is cause by diverse appetites (of different individuals or within one individual) inhabiting the same order/being unified.
peace is a transcendental of the good. To argue that peace is a transcendental of the good, one must argue that it is identical in subiecto with the good and unfolds from its ratio.
In this section, I give three arguments that peace is a transcendental of the good and answer objections along the way. First, peace is identical to the good in subject and flows from its ratio. Second, although peace is contained implicitly in the ratio of the good, its conceptual addition to the good adds conceptual content to ens. Third, Aquinas predicates peace of the divine nature and implies that peace is necessarily in every one of God's effects. Only the transcendentals can be predicated of the divine nature and are universal in God's effects.
The Identity of Peace and Good
Although Aquinas does not use the technical language of the transcendentals when discussing peace, he certainly implies that peace is identical in subject with the good.
62
As an implication of this, both the positive aspect of peace (union/order) and the negative (tranquility/rest) are implicit in the ratio of the good. Based on this reduction, the argument for peace's transcendental status would be implied. Peace is a conceptual explanation of the good, and the good is transcendental. Hence, peace, also functions as a quasi-transcendental.
In the de Veritate Aquinas is at his most explicit on the relation between the good and peace. Therein he says that "when the appetite terminates in the good, and peace, and beauty, it does not terminate in separate things (diversa). And from this fact, it follows that when something desires the good, it desires at the same time both the beautiful and peace". If peace and the good are not diverse, then they are one and do not include the negation of the other. This is a strong indicator that Aquinas holds peace and goodness to be identical in subject. 65 62 In contrast to beauty, where Aquinas certainly does do this. See STh I, q. 5, a. 4, ad 1. 63 De Ver. q. 22, a. 1, ad 12 : "Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod appetitum terminari ad bonum et pacem et pulchrum, non est eum terminari in diversa. Ex hoc enim ipso quod aliquid appetit bonum, appetit simul et pulchrum et pacem… Pax autem importat remotionem perturbantium et impedientium adeptionem boni. Ex hoc autem ipso quod aliquid desideratur, desideratur etiam remotio impedimentorum ipsius. Unde simul et eodem appetitu appetitur bonum, pulchrum et pax". 64 See Rubin, "The Place of 'Thing' and 'Something' in Aquinas's Order of the Transcendentals," 417-418; In X Meta., l. 4, n. 35: "Omne enim quod est ens et unum in se, comparatum alteri, aut est unum ei, et sic est idem; aut non unum, aptum natum esse unum, et sic est diversum"; Super Boetium de Trinitate, q. 4 a. 1 co.: "[U]nde et ab hoc ente non diuiditur hoc ens <nisi> per hoc quod in hoc ente includitur negatio illius entis". 65 In IV Sent., d. 49, q. 1, a. 2, qc. 4, ad 1 & 4. In these texts, Aquinas distinguishes peace from the end. He says it is "quasi propinquissima dispositio ad finem, quae est simul cum ipso fine; et non quasi ipsa sit per se finis". It is possible that Aquinas develops on this point by the DV when he claims peace is not diverse from the good. Aquinas' early thought on peace is almost purely dispositive, but this is not true of his more mature thought. Likewise, it seems that Aquinas' youthful distinction between peace and the end cannot be quite right. Something lacks motion (is at rest) to the extent it is perfect/in act.
One can also see the identity of peace with the good from the claim that peace is an aspect of every end; peace has a rationem finis.
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While commenting on Paul's salutation "Grace unto you and peace…" Aquinas says, "the final of all gifts is peace, because peace is the general end of the mind (generalis finis mentis). For in any way peace is taken, it has the concept of an end. In eternal glory, governing, and behavior, the end is peace".
67
By saying that peace is the general end of the mind, Aquinas is indicating that it is not just a particular end (a particular good), but the general end of the human mind. He even calls peace the "universal good".
68
He says explicitly elsewhere: "Peace follows from every good" 69 and one has peace when "one is quieted and perfected in the good".
70
Another argument for the identity of peace and the good is Aquinas' claim that peace adds nothing beyond the ratio of the good. "Pax nihil adiiciunt super rationem boni". 71 All that peace would add is conceptually implicit in the ratio of the good. In other words, just as the transcendentals are implicit in ens, peace is part of the conceptual outflowing of bonum. 72 Peace is simply another aspect of the good all desire. Hence, the degree of goodness is the degree of union/order. The degree of union is the degree of rest/tranquility. In other words, both the positive aspect of peace (union/order) and the negative (tranquility/rest) are implicit in the perfect and desirable (appetibile).
Positively, union/order are an aspect of the ratio of the good. As Aquinas says, "good consists in order. For something is not only good because it is an end, or because it achieves an end. Even if it does not arrive at the end, provided that it is ordered to it, it can be called good".
73
Not even prime matter falls outside of order to an end. 74 In other words, all things have an inchoate union with a good to which they are ordered, an inchoate relation. On account of this relation, all things can be called good. Since the positive aspect of peace is union/order, all things can be said to be at peace as well.
The negative aspect of peace (tranquility/rest), can also be reduced to the ratio of the good. The transcendental good is distinguished by being's relation to appetite. Being is appetible because it is perfect. Aquinas clearly holds that whoever desires the good desires to obtain it, hold it, and rest in it without conflict and disturbance. 75 Yet this is simply to desire peace. Therefore, Aquinas is adamant that all desire peace. 76 Likewise, the degree to which the good is achieved is the degree to which appetite is brought to rest. Neither a lack of conflict nor rest adds positively to the good. Yet they immediately follow from the good, the way unum follows from ens. Whatever is ens is undivided; whatever is good is at rest.
Because of peace's identity with the good in subject, peace shares in the properties of the good. It is universal in extension, has no opposite (it is only reduced by privation), and admits of true and false instantiations. Peace extends universally to all things, since all created things are part of God's wise order.
77
All things are ordered to the separate common good of God and desire God's peace, "omnia suo modo desiderant divinam pacem (…)". 78 Certainly, the proper concept of peace is more manifest in rational creatures, but it does not only appear there. 79 Anything can be at peace. 80 At least initially, it seems that conflict (what is opposed to peace) 81 is a positive reality, a something (aliquid). 82 However, this cannot be the case. Conflict and disturbance are dependent on the good and peace. In contraries, one is the privation of the other. 83 Conflict is either the result of sin or, 84 if not the result of sin, identical with privation. 85 Finally, peace, just like the good, admits of true and false instantiations. Just as someone can pursue a merely apparent good, someone can have merely apparent peace. The tranquility/rest produced by the love of a false good produces the simulacrum of peace. Authentic peace is only found in the true good. 86 In other words, the wicked cannot enjoy peace.
87
As Aquinas says, "They [the pax mundi and the peace of Christ] differ inasmuch as one is simulated, and one is true".
88
Here we encounter a problem though. How can union/order, which Aquinas claims is a relation, be implicit in the ratio of the transcendental good? Relation is categorical and so, it would seem, peace must be too. In responding to this difficulty, one should first note that Aquinas affirms that relation is part of the ratio of the transcendental good. 89 Yet that does not answer the question. How can the transcendental good have relation in its ratio? Relation is categorical. The problem simply reasserts itself.
The key to answering this question comes in a traditional Thomistic doctrine of transcendental relations.
90
According to this doctrine, relation can also transcend the categories and apply to act/potency, essence/existence, form/matter. As De Raeymaker says, "[Each of these principles] is identified entirely with the relation which binds it to its co-principle, and it does not contain anything which is not referred to this other principle".
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For example, when we use the language of potency being ordered to act we are not positing an accidental relation somehow adhering in potency, but rather claiming that potency as a principle is a relation to act. Put differently, each of these principles is in union with the other.
It is easy to see why Aquinas ascribes transcendental relation/order/union to the transcendental good. This is what the good means, in part, when it is predicated of being. Whatever is ordered to another is ordered to it as to a final cause. Thus, while bonum certainly does come at the end of the normative list of transcendentals, that does not mean that it does not offer further conceptual explanation of what went before. Good adds, in the most fundamental sense, that beings are appetible to the extent they are perfect. To be appetible is to be a final cause, the implication of desirability. 92 Likewise, given that the good is a final cause, the transcendental good 86 STh II-II, q. 29, a. 2, ad 4: "Ad quartum dicendum quod, cum vera pax non sit nisi de bono, sicut dupliciter habetur verum bonum, scilicet perfecte et imperfecte, ita est duplex pax vera. Una quidem perfecta, quae consistit in perfecta fruitione summi boni, per quam omnes appetitus uniuntur quietati in uno. Et hic est ultimus finis creaturae rationalis, secundum illud Psalm., qui posuit fines tuos pacem. Alia vero est pax imperfecta, quae habetur in hoc mundo. Quia etsi principalis animae motus quiescat in Deo, sunt tamen aliqua repugnantia et intus et extra quae perturbant hanc pacem". 87 In Is. c. 48; In Ier., c. 14, l. 4 & c. 16, l. 1; In Iob c. 9; In II Cor. c. 13, l. 3, n. 542. 88 In Io c. 14, l. 7: "Secundo vero quantum ad simulationem et veritatem: quia pax mundi est simulata, quia tantum exterius". 89 De Ver. 21.6: "The ratio of the good implies a relation, not because the name good signifies only a relation, but because it signifies something upon which a relation is consequent along with the relation itself". 90 Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas, 320 n. 96. 91 For the source of this quote see Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas, 320 n. 96. 92 STh I, q. 5, a. 3. co. also implies order/relation. Only with the bonum do the concepts of res, unum, and aliquid achieve order.
93
The good is a positive addition of conceptual content to the previous two transcendentals, not just that being is appetible, but also that it is ordered/unified. As Aquinas says, "The unity of a multitude is peace" 94 and "when the Lord prays that the disciples be perfect in goodness, he prays that they would be one".
95
According to Aquinas, peace, in its positive aspect, is reduced to a conceptual explanation of final causality, what it is to be ordered/in union with the good. The positive element of the essence of peace is order/union, a determinate relation to the good. If we are to avoid positing accidents adhering in the transcendentals (which are certainly ordered/in union), it seems that peace (as order/union) must be another name for transcendental relation. Likewise, based on this order/union, peace in its negative aspect adds that order/union brings rest. The positive conceptual addition of peace to the good is followed immediately by a negative conceptual addition. What is in union with the good is not in conflict with it and rests in it to the degree of that unity.
In summary, it seems that peace is identical in subject to the good but adds conceptually. It adds nothing beyond the ratio of the good but is itself a conceptual outflow of that same ratio. What is good is desirable; what is desirable is a final cause; what is a final cause contains order. What is ordered/unified is not in conflict and is at rest. Just like what is ens is unum (lacking division), what is good is at peace (ordered/unified, at rest, and lacking conflict). Thus, it seems right to claim that peace is a transcendental of the good.
Peace Adds Conceptual Content to Being
Whereas the above section claims that peace is identical in subject with the good but names the rationes of order/union and rest, this section claims that these two notions add (through their conceptual explanation of the good) to our information concerning ens. In other words, through peace's conceptual explanation of the good-it adds conceptually to being. To the extent that something is in act, it is ordered/unified and at rest.
The conceptual addition of peace to being is easiest to see in the negative aspect of peace. Something is at rest to the extent it is in act/perfect. When arguing that good is a transcendental, Aquinas links the good with the perfect and the perfect with what 93 In De Div. Nom. c. 11, l. 2, n. 896: "Inveniuntur autem aliqua, quae in sepisis diversa sunt, sed uniuntur in aliquot uno, sicut multi homines uniuntur in una domo, sed Deus in seipso unitus est". 94 De Regno, lib. 1, c. 16, co.: "multitudinis autem unitas, quae pax dicitur(…)". 95 In Io. c. 17, l. 5, n. 2238: "Nam, ut Platonici dicunt ab hoc quaelibet res habet unitatem a quo habet bonitatem. Bonum enim est quod est rei conservativum; nulla autem res conservatur nisi per hoc quod est una. Et ideo Dominus petens discipulorum perfectionem in bonitate, petit quod sint unum". is in act.
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One can easily replicate this argument but substitute the negative ratio of peace (rest). The argument would go as follows. Being and peace are identical but differ only in ratio. The essence of peace is rest. Now a thing is at rest insofar as it is perfect, and everything is perfect insofar as it is actual. It is clear, then, that something is at rest inasmuch as it exists, since it is existence that makes all things actual. Peace adds the ratio of rest to being. 97 Part of this argument requires explanation. Is something at rest inasmuch as it is perfect? That is the key question. In recalling Aquinas' thought about rest as a lack of motion, one can see why perfection implies a lack of motion. Motion is a mark of imperfection, a becoming toward a new perfection. 98 Put differently, motion implies potency. Both becoming and potency imply a lack. If rest is a lack of motion, it implies the achievement of some perfection, of some act. In other words, if one is not at rest it is because one lacks a perfection toward which one is moving. Yet when one achieves that perfection one ceases to seek it and rests. Hence, it seems right to say that the negative aspect of peace adds a ratio to being. Inasmuch as something is actual, it is at rest. In this way more act and less potency is more peace (in the negative sense).
In some ways, it is more difficult to see how the positive ratio of peace can add conceptually to being. Is ens ordered/unified? That is the central question. One might approach this question in multiple ways, and all seem to end in an affirmative answer. The first way to approach this question focuses on creation and order. If one recalls Aquinas' thought about order, it is related to a principle and the principle in question here is final causality. Does all being have one final cause? Aquinas certainly thinks so: all creation inhabits a single order. 99 He even claims that this one order is caused by the universal desire for divine peace.
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Divine peace is the final cause of all things.
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This would seem to imply that ens is ordered. The second way of approaching the question focuses on composition. As said above, order/union adds conceptually to the good that the correlative principles of being (act/potency, form/matter, substance/accident) are in union with each other, are ordered to each other. This is why earlier I claimed that transcendental relation is part of the ratio of the good. Hence, if the good is a transcendental and includes transcendental relation, then ens is ordered/unified. As Aquinas says, union is the ratio of peace and "it is impossible that some being (aliquod ens) would totally escape union".
Finally, one might reflect on Aquinas' commitment that prime matter is good. Prime matter, which according to Aquinas is being in potency, is good (and not simply in potency).
103
This is because prime matter is ordered to an end. Potency is ordered to act. If even prime matter is ordered, this would seem to be true of all other things. Peace, in its positive aspect, names this conceptual addition. Ens is unified/ordered.
Finally, one must make a distinction concerning the identity of being and peace. It is the same caveat that Aquinas makes concerning the identity of goodness and being. 104 According to Aquinas, we must distinguish between the good simpliciter and secundum quid. The good simpliciter requires that a being have all perfections proper to it whereas the good secundum quid requires only existence. Being is the reverse. The existence of substance is being simpliciter and accidents are only being secundum quid. Because peace is a transcendental of the good, one must make the same kind of distinction with peace. So, what is simply in being is only at peace secundum quid. What is at peace simpliciter is in being secundum quid. As Aertsen says though, "Since actuality is always the actualization of being, the absolute goodness of a thing [and hence its peace too] can also be seen as its completed and perfected being". 
Peace and the Divine Nature
The final argument confirms what we have seen above, peace is a transcendental of the good.
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Aquinas clearly thinks peace can be predicated of God and even uses the language typical of being when doing so. This is especially the case in his Commentary on the Divine Names. On the other hand, this commentary creates a difficulty and forces a precision in predicating peace of God. It seems that one can only strictly and properly predicate peace's positive ratio of God after receiving revelation.
Before treating the difficulty, it is clear that Aquinas affirms that peace can be predicated of the divine nature and uses the language of the transcendentals when doing so. Aquinas calls God "per se peace in himself, taken in the abstract".
107
He even uses the language of subsistens, mimicking his typical phrase for predicating esse of God (esse ipsum subsistens).
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Though predications of this type could be used of the pure perfections, coupled with the arguments in the previous two sections, they strongly imply that peace is a transcendental of the good.
In explaining how peace is predicated of God, Aquinas strengthens the case. Peace, Aquinas writes, arises from unity, and God is one in himself, admitting of no diversity. 109 In other words, God is not composed of divisible parts, is not numerical, and is in every way simple. Aquinas' language for God's simplicity and unity is forceful. He distinguishes four ways in which unity can be said and claims God is the highest, simpliciter and secundum se unum.
Furthermore, only a transcendental or pure perfection can be properly predicated of God. Yet, it is impossible that peace be a pure perfection, such as wisdom, for pure perfections are only found in some of God's effects. Order/union and rest are universally found. 125 Hence, it seems better to put it under the transcendentals. On the other hand, Aquinas' Commentary on the Divine Names also poses a puzzle: he seems to change the positive ratio of peace from union to unity. The strict ratio of peace is order/union being at rest. Peace in its positive aspect denotes the oneness of a multitude, but not oneness absolutely and simply speaking. Peace presupposes plurality, oneness does not. 128 Peace presupposes 'something' and 'multitude' etc. a lack of division does not.
Without revelation of the Trinity, one could not say there is distinction or multitude in God, both of which are required to properly predicate the positive ratio of peace. 129 It seems that in chapter 11 of Aquinas' Commentary on the Divine Names, Aquinas is speaking philosophically. What is secundum quid unum (the proper ratio of peace) is surpassed by what is unum simpliciter and hence one can say God is peace in a positive sense since he surpasses the strict ratio of peace. Following from this one can philosophically predicate the negative ratio of peace. Because God is unum simpliciter, he is maximally at rest and without conflict.
What Aquinas writes does not exclude the proper predication of peace though, for what is unum is undivided. Peace, properly speaking, does not require division, but only distinction. 130 Theologically, this allows one to both make sense of the data of revelation and predicate transcendental multitude of God without implying he is not simpliciter and secundum se unum. 131 The Trinitarian Persons are not divisions of the divine nature but are distinct from one another. 132 Aquinas says this explicitly, predicating both union and order: "If from the one person of the Father proceeds two persons, that is the Son and the Holy Spirit, it is necessary that there be a certain order between them".
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Aquinas also appropriates peace to the Holy Spirit, who is the nexus, the unio, between the Father and the Son. 134 This makes perfect sense if union and order are reduced to relation. The persons of the Trinity are subsistent relations of opposition and thus distinct. 135 Peace, in its positive aspect, only requires distinction. Distinction is not division. 136 If this is right, then attending to Aquinas' Trinitarian theology both strengthens the case for predicating peace of God and the claim that peace is a transcendental of the good.
Philosophically speaking, it seems one could only predicate the positive ratio of peace secundum quid (inasmuch as it approximates what is one simply speaking). Yet, theologically speaking, it seems one can properly predicate union and order of God. Following from this, the order of the divine persons is without disturbance. God, the Trinity, in perfect subsisting act, is eternally at rest as order/union to each other.
Conclusion
Aquinas never explicitly broaches the topic of peace's transcendental status. Likewise, the Thomistic tradition has only hints at this possibility. 137 Nevertheless, if the above analysis is right, then Aquinas implicitly held that peace is a transcendental of the good. It is not an independent transcendental, adding conceptually to being apart from the good, but through its identity with the good and its conceptual explanation of the good, peace adds to being. Peace adds a concept not expressed by the term being, but coextensive with it: inasmuch as something is -it is ordered/unified. Inasmuch as something is, it is without motion, it is perfect (at rest in the good).
